Hate Speech Laws, Legitimacy, and Precaution: A Reply to James Weinstein by Brown, Alexander
 1 
Hate Speech Laws, Legitimacy, and Precaution: A Reply to James Weinstein 
 
Alexander Brown 
 
 
Ronald Dworkin once remarked to me that he thought Robert Nozick was a highly 
skilled defender of the indefensible. I have the impression from reading James 
Weinstein’s interesting article that this is partly how he sees defenders of hate speech 
bans.1 This is not how I see myself, of course; which is to say, I see myself as neither 
especially skilful nor as defending the indefensible. Indeed, given that, as I attempted 
to show in my recent book,2 not only does virtually every person on the planet live 
under at least some form of hate speech law but also such law is marked by great 
internal variety, I rather suspect that what is indefensible is either rejecting or 
defending hate speech law en mass. I hope to bring this out in my contribution to this 
symposium.3 
 There is much in Weinstein’s article to contemplate, but I shall limit myself to 
making the following four main points. First, I believe that debates concerning the 
normative standing of hate speech law are always improved by heeding the internal 
variety of such law, and although I can see something of that same care in Weinstein’s 
article, such as when he distinguishes between different forms of hate speech law 
based on relative detriment to the legitimacy of so-called downstream laws, in some 
instances this care is lacking. Second, Weinstein plays up the importance of collective 
authorisation or democratic legitimacy of downstream laws vis-à-vis ‘(a) the 
obligation of those restrained by the speech restriction to obey a downstream 
antidiscrimination law; and (b) the morality of enforcing the downstream measure 
against those whose participatory rights have been impaired by the upstream speech 
restriction.’4 These may be important aspects of what it means to detract from the 
legitimacy of downstream laws but they do not exhaust the relevant aspects. Third, I 
think that Weinstein’s article ignores some important nuances in what I have argued 
about hate speech laws and political legitimacy, and ignores something that might be 
true of the relationship between political and democratic legitimacy, namely, that 
political legitimacy takes lexical priority over and, therefore, cannot be traded off 
against, the collective authorisation or democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. 
Finally, I believe that in describing my use of the precautionary principle as ‘plainly 
                                                 
1 James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy, CONST. 
COMMENT. 
2 ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION (2015). 
3 I shall not, however, attempt a detailed analysis of the concept hate speech, nor 
comment on which groups ought to be protected by hate speech laws. For more on 
these thorny issues, see Alexander Brown, What is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of 
Hate, LAW AND PHIL. (forthcoming); Alexander Brown, What is Hate Speech? 
Part 2: Family Resemblances’, LAW AND PHIL. (forthcoming); Alexander Brown, 
The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1: Consistency, Practical, 
and Formal Approaches, 29 CAN. J. LAW JUR. 275 (2016); Alexander Brown, The 
‘Who?’ Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 2: Functional and Democratic 
Approaches, 30 CAN. J. LAW JUR. 23 (2017).  
4 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 6–7 [manuscript].  
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indefensible’ Weinstein has done justice neither to the raw plausibility of that 
principle nor to how I applied it to the special silencing effects of hate speech. 
 I plan to make the aforementioned points in the course of responding to two main 
objections that Weinstein levels against the arguments I made concerning hate speech 
regulations and political legitimacy in Chapter 7 of my book. The first objection 
concerns my response to Dworkin’s argument that if we introduce ‘upstream’ hate 
speech regulations and thereby ‘intervene too soon in the process through which 
collective opinion is formed’, then ‘we spoil the only democratic justification we have 
for insisting that everyone obey [downstream] laws’.5 I argued in response to Dworkin 
that there might also be a sense in which hate speech bans are not a threat to but a 
requirement of political legitimacy. I suggested that the question of the political 
legitimacy of, say, the legal system, might turn on whether the legal system could be 
the subject of interpersonal justification and consensus among free and equal citizens. 
More precisely, I said ‘that political legitimacy, including the legitimacy of the legal 
system, itself depends upon its being possible, at least in principle, to justify that 
system to each citizen bound by it on the basis of fundamentals of justice that they 
cannot reasonably reject’.6 I also proposed that 
 
members of minority or vulnerable groups could reasonably reject the 
following justification of an absolutist free speech doctrine. “For fear that 
hate speech law may put at risk the collective authorization and political 
legitimacy of downstream laws from which you benefit, we shall neglect to 
utilize the measures at our disposal to curb forms of hate speech that can be 
corrosive of a shared, public sense of the basic elements of your reputation, 
status and dignity as members of society in good standing.”7 
 
I believe that this attempt to justify an aggressive free speech regime to the victims of 
hate speech would fail because they would rightly see it as violating fundamentals of 
justice. By ‘fundamentals of justice’ I mean, following Waldron’s definition, 
‘propositions establishing everyone’s right to justice and elementary security, 
everyone’s claim to have their welfare counted along with everyone else’s welfare in 
the determination of social policy, and everyone’s legal status as a rights-bearing 
member of society.’8 These are, I believe, basic propositions that everyone can, and 
should, be willing to accept, and that, under certain circumstances, will constitute 
grounds for reasonably rejecting an aggressive free speech regime. 
 However, Weinstein objects that despite my having provided a legitimacy-based 
argument for hate speech bans, I have nevertheless failed to provide a like-for-like 
legitimacy-based argument in response to Dworkin. In order for a legitimacy-based 
argument to have traction against Dworkin’s contention that upstream hate speech 
bans can spoil the legitimacy of downstream laws then such an argument must also 
work at the level of the legitimacy of downstream laws, claims Weinstein. In his 
words, 
 
                                                 
5 Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY v, viii 
(I. Hare and J. Weinstein eds., 2009). 
6 BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at 208. 
7 Id. 
8 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 H. L. REV. 
1596, 1626, n 127 (2010). 
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even on the assumption that failure to enact hate speech laws does 
compromise legitimacy, it is, as Brown notes, the legitimacy of “the legal 
system” that has been diminished, not the obligation to obey or the morality 
of an enforcement of a particular or laws. [...] It is difficult, however, to 
weigh a loss to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the legitimacy a 
particular law. The work done by these two types of legitimacy is very 
different. The concern of systemic legitimacy is, as Brown notes, 
identification with the legal system. In contrast, the concern about the 
legitimacy of a particular law that I have emphasized in this article is whether 
it is moral for the state to use force to make dissenters comply with a law with 
which they can reasonably disagree.9 
 
 Weinstein has missed some important nuances in what I said about political 
legitimacy, however. For one thing, what I actually said was that ‘political legitimacy, 
including the legitimacy of the legal system,’ itself depends interpersonal justification 
and consensus among free and equal citizens. I used the term ‘including’ in a non-
exhaustive way, to mean at least this (but not necessarily only this). Indeed, the 
illustrative example I gave focused on the interpersonal justification of what I called 
‘an absolutist free speech doctrine’, which is only one feature of the system of law, 
albeit an important one. It is an open question whether a failure to justify this feature 
would constitute not just a deficit in the legitimacy of this feature but also a deficit in 
the legitimacy of the entire legal and political system. This would depend on whether 
the legal and political system as a whole could be the subject of interpersonal 
justification and consensus among free and equal citizens, given attempts to justify 
the totality of its constitutional laws, civil rights laws, public policies, and so on. At 
any rate, I believe that the question of political legitimacy based on interpersonal 
justification and consensus among free and equal citizens can be meaningfully applied 
to particular features of the legal and political system, including both upstream and 
downstream laws, as well as to the entirety of that system. 
 This clarification is important for understanding what I would say about the 
legitimacy of downstream laws such as those involved in Waldron’s English landlord 
example. Waldron asks us to image a landlord who discriminates against English 
families of South Asian descent in a way that is prohibited by English 
antidiscrimination laws. At the same time, English hate speech laws, such as laws 
banning the stirring up of racial hatred, prevent the landlord from using threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour with either the intention or likelihood of 
stirring up hatred against Pakistanis defined as a racial, ethnic or national group.10 
Whereas Dworkin claims that upstream can spoil the legitimacy of downstream 
antidiscrimination laws − laws that protect the very people who are also protected by 
the upstream laws − Waldron contends that ‘if we had a law that was specifically 
tailored to prohibit only expression at the viciously vituperative end of this spectrum, 
it might be an open question whether it would have anything more than a minimal 
effect on legitimacy.’11 Weinstein criticises Waldron for intimating that the detriment 
to the legitimacy of the downstream law could prove to be ‘minimal’.12 But he also 
                                                 
9 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 5 [manuscript]. 
10 Waldron, supra note 8, at 1643. 
11 Id. at 1646. 
12 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 4 [manuscript], and subpart A of Part 
III. Note, however, that whilst Weinstein claims these hate speech laws are 
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criticises me for failing to provide a like-for-like legitimacy-based argument in 
response to Dworkin.13 However, I believe that my account of political legitimacy 
does have the wherewithal to say something about the political legitimacy of 
downstream laws based on interpersonal justification and consensus among free and 
equal citizens. Specifically, I think that it is quite possible to justify an 
antidiscrimination law even to those people who disagree with it and who are denied 
certain specific types of opportunities (but not all types of opportunities) to publicly 
argue against it. It might go something along these lines. “You have an obligation to 
obey antidiscrimination laws, and we have a moral right to enforce antidiscrimination 
laws, for the simple reason that the state has a duty to fight injustice and it is clearly 
unjust to discriminate against people in their access to jobs, housing, transport, 
services, and so forth, merely because of their possession of protected characteristics, 
and, what is more, you have this obligation, and we have this moral right, even if hate 
speech laws reduce to some extent the collective authorisation of these very same 
antidiscrimination laws and therefore diminish the democratic legitimacy of these 
laws, keeping in mind the fact that we are utilising narrowly framed hate speech laws 
to curb forms of hate speech that can be corrosive of a shared, public sense of the 
basic elements of people’s reputation, status and dignity as members of society in 
good standing, and recognising that the state also has a duty to protect this public 
good.” I believe that such an attempt to interpersonally justify the antidiscrimination 
law would succeed because it appeals to fundamentals of justice that nobody can 
reasonably reject.  
 There is another, related nuance that Weinstein has missed. In my book I 
presented the process of interpersonal justification and consensus among free and 
equal people as a way of assessing hate speech law from ‘the sole perspective of 
political legitimacy’.14 I made it clear that ‘[t]his is not about trading off political 
legitimacy with the assurance of civic dignity but about the way in which the 
assurance of civic dignity is constitutive of the realization of political legitimacy.’15 In 
a similar vein, pace Weinstein’s interpretation, I am not attempting to ‘weigh a loss to 
systemic legitimacy against a detriment to the legitimacy a particular law’. Rather, I 
am claiming that the upstream hate speech law is politically legitimate only insofar as 
it could be the subject of interpersonal justification and consensus among free and 
equal people and, similarly, that the downstream antidiscrimination law is politically 
legitimate only insofar as it could also be the subject of interpersonal justification and 
consensus among free and equal people. This holds true even if the downstream law 
suffers diminished democratic legitimacy due to the politically legitimate upstream 
law. So this is not about weighing a loss to systemic legitimacy against a detriment to 
the legitimacy of a particular law. Rather, it is about recognising the appropriateness 
of iterative applications of the test of political legitimacy for the legal system but also 
                                                                                                                                            
detrimental to legitimacy, he stops short of saying that such laws would actually 
remove the landlord’s normative obligation to obey the law and the state’s moral right 
to enforce the law against him. Ibid. So despite Weinstein’s baulking at Waldron’s 
use of the word ‘minimal’, both he and Waldron are in perfect agreement that 
whatever the nature of the detriment to the legitimacy of downstream law, it is not 
‘catastrophic’. Waldron, ‘Dignity and Defamation’, p. 1642. 
13 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 35–36 [manuscript]. 
14 BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at 208. 
15 Id. 
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for upstream and downstream laws, and, furthermore, about placing political 
legitimacy and democratic legitimacy in what might be their rightful order of priority. 
 Weinstein’s second objection focuses directly on my argument that free and equal 
people could reasonably reject a proposal for an aggressive free speech regime that 
disallows hate speech bans even if the justification for the proposal appealed to the 
protection of the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. According to Weinstein, 
this argument underestimates the available evidence on the negative impact of hate 
speech laws on the democratic legitimacy of downstream laws. He writes:  
 
If this article has demonstrated anything, it is that hate speech laws as they 
actually exist, and of the type that Brown thinks justified, present much more 
than some “risk” to “collective authorization and legitimacy of downstream 
laws” from which members of these groups benefit. Nor, contrary to Brown’s 
exposition of Waldron’s erroneous view, have they resulted in only 
“relatively minor reduction in the collective authorization of downstream 
laws.” Rather, as discussed in subsections B and C of this Part [IV], their 
effect on legitimacy, both in the normative and descriptive sense, is 
substantial. In light of such significant detriment to political legitimacy, even 
if one accepts hypothetical consent as basis of political legitimacy, there is a 
very real question whether Brown’s hypothetical interlocutors could 
reasonably reject the failure of a jurisdiction to enact broad hate speech 
prohibitions of the type Brown defends as contrary to “the fundamentals of 
justice.”16 
 
Now I am not entirely certain what Weinstein has in mind when he says I defend 
‘broad hate speech prohibitions.’ But he does give a clue in the footnote attached to 
the sentence ‘hate speech laws as they actually exist, and of the type that Brown 
thinks justified’. He writes: 
 
Thus far beyond the ban on highly vituperative hate speech that Waldron 
thinks might be justified, Brown defends bans on group defamation (sensu 
stricto) and on incitement to racial hatred, id. at 214. Despite the seemingly 
limited scope of such laws, they have, as I have demonstrated, used to impair, 
and perhaps in some case destroy, the legitimacy of downstream 
antidiscrimination laws. See subparts A and B of this Part [IV].17 
 
Nevertheless, I find this to be a strange line of objection given that subparts A and B 
of Part IV of Weinstein’s article in fact have nothing to say about group defamation 
laws (sensu stricto) and relatively little to say about incitement to hatred laws (aside 
from one Dutch case heard by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) about 
which I shall say more in a moment). Instead, the vast majority of what he says in 
these subparts concerns expression-oriented hate crimes,18 specifically, public order 
offences involving threatening or abusive words or behaviour, that are aggravated by 
                                                 
16 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 34–35 [manuscript]. 
17 Id. at 34, n 171 [manuscript]. 
18 See BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at 35–38. 
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hostility toward people based on their possession of certain protected characteristics.19 
In other words, despite what Weinstein suggests, subparts A and B of his article have 
certainly not ‘demonstrated’ that group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement 
to hatred laws have been used to impair or even destroy the legitimacy of downstream 
antidiscrimination laws. 
 To expand on this point, I take it that, for Weinstein, the most problematic hate 
speech laws are those that leave little or no leeway or room for people to express 
certain views in other permissible ways. In subpart A (Part IV) he cites various 
aggravated public order offences in England and Wales that he believes have, as 
applied, effectively prevented people from expressing in public their sincerely held 
religious view that homosexuality is immoral even without using epithets or slurs or 
stirring up hatred.20 Then, in subpart B (Part IV), Weinstein spells out what he takes to 
be the ‘annihilation’ of legitimacy of downstream laws associated with such upstream 
laws. Here he claims that people who have actually been prevented by such upstream 
laws from expressing in public the view that homosexuality is immoral no longer 
have a political obligation to obey downstream antidiscrimination laws. What is more, 
he claims that such hate speech laws might even, in worst case scenarios, ‘render 
immoral’ the enforcement of downstream laws against people that have been silenced 
by them. However, these particular sorts of hate speech laws, what I call expression-
oriented hate crime laws, are in fact much broader and more restrictive of speech than 
the group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to hatred laws that I 
defended in Chapter 7 of my book. So even if these expression-oriented hate crime 
laws have, in their application by the police, prosecutors and courts in England and 
Wales, effectively prevented people from even temperately expressing in public their 
view that homosexuality is immoral, the same is not necessarily true of incitement to 
hatred laws in England and Wales. Indeed, I would argue that these other, more 
narrowly framed hate speech laws do allow space for people to express certain views 
in other permissible ways.21  
 By way of justification for this position, consider Part 3A of the Public Order Act 
1986 (as amended by s. 74 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act in 2008) 
which sets out various offences relating to the stirring up of hatred on grounds of 
sexual orientation (and religion). It is narrowly framed in at least two important ways. 
                                                 
19 For some concrete examples of how such hate speech laws have been used in 
England and Wales, see Brown, The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: 
Part 1, supra note 3, at 285–86, 288–89, n 172, 311, n 252.  
20 Two offences are involved in many of Weinstein’s examples. The first is s. 4A of 
the Public Order Act 1986 (‘Intentional harassment, alarm or distress’), which makes 
it an offence for someone to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour 
or to display any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress and thereby 
causing harassment, alarm or distress. The second is s. 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 
(as amended by s. 57 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013) (‘Harassment, alarm or 
distress’), which makes it an offence for someone to use threatening or abusive (as 
amended) words or behaviour or to display any writing, sign or other visible 
representation which is threatening or abusive within the hearing or sight of a person 
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. 
21 I note that Waldron makes a similar point in his contribution to this symposium. 
See Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy: A Response to James Weinstein, 
CONST. COMMENT., s. II. 
 7 
First, it is written in such a way as to ensure that hate speakers have other permissible 
ways of stirring up hatred. This is because the law makes clear that the offences are 
only committed if people intentionally use ‘threatening’ words or behaviour or written 
material or public performance of play or recording in order to stir up hatred. Non-
threatening modes of expression are untouched by these particular offences. Second, 
s. 29JA of Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by Schedule 7 of the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013) directly and explicitly states that people 
cannot be treated as stirring up hatred merely because they engage in discussion or 
criticism of homosexual conduct or gay marriage, for instance. This also gives 
speakers, including speakers motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs, some 
significant leeway to express their views on homosexuality and gay marriage without 
prosecution. I would also add here that other countries also have similar caveats 
written into their incitement to hatred laws.22 
 Now, at this stage, Weinstein might point to how incitement to hatred laws have 
been used by the courts in some cases to limit or reduce the range of options for 
expression among hate speakers, and that this alone is a significant detriment to the 
legitimacy of downstream laws, even if they have not been banned from expressing 
certain views as such. For example, in subpart A (Part IV) Weinstein does cite one 
example of an application of incitement to hatred law. In Glimmerveen and 
Hagenbeek v. Netherlands (1979)23 ECtHR judged as inadmissible applications made 
by two Dutch nationals who had been found guilty by domestic courts of possessing, 
with intent to distribute, leaflets that incited racial discrimination. So if what Johann 
Glimmerveen really wanted to do, as an exercise of his right to contribute to public 
discourse, was to express his views in such a way that constitutes incitement to racial 
discrimination, then he was not able to do so. In that sense his range of options were 
limited or reduced. Or consider the English case R. v. Ali, Javed, and Ahmed (2012),24 
which is not discussed by Weinstein. In July 2010 three devout but also socially 
conservative members of the Muslim faith distributed leaflets on the streets of Derby 
titled ‘Turn or Burn’, ‘GAY – God Abhors You’, ‘Death Penalty?’ as a protest to the 
Gay Pride Festival taking place that day. They became the first people to be 
successfully prosecuted for offences relating to stirring up hatred on grounds of sexual 
orientation in England and Wales. In his sentencing remarks Judge Burgess made 
reference to the aforementioned clause 29JA but nevertheless supported the jury’s 
decision that in this particular case the wording of the leaflets did amount to the use of 
threatening words or behavior with the intention of stirring up hatred, based on the 
                                                 
22 In Canada, for example, the part of the criminal code that bans wilful promotion of 
hatred also contains exemptions or permissible defences against prosecution ‘if, in 
good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an argument an opinion 
on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text’. See s. 
319(3)(b) of the Criminal Code (as amended by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code 
(Hate Propaganda) of 2004). Likewise, some states in Australia have on the books 
legislation banning incitement to hatred which sets out exemptions for speech that has 
a religious purpose or is motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs. See ss. 11(b)(i) 
and 11(2) of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (the State of Victoria) and 
see s. 80G(1)(b)(i) and 80G(1)(b)(i) (as amended by s. 6 of Law No. 80 of 2004) (the 
State of Western Australia). 
23 Nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78 (ECtHR, 11 Oct.). 
24 No. T20110109 (Derby Cr. Ct., 10 Feb.) (involving offences of stirring up hatred on 
grounds of sexual orientation). 
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fact that four homosexual men had read the leaflet and ‘All felt threatened’.25 In that 
sense the intervention by the police and courts did limit or reduce their range of 
options in how they could permissibly express their view that homosexuality is a sin 
and one that should be punished in ways indicated in their religious texts. Maybe what 
Weinstein would say about this case is exactly what he says about some of the cases 
he presents in subpart A, Part IV, namely, that these speech restrictions ‘effectively 
prevented these citizens from participating in the public discussion of a host of 
antidiscrimination measures, as well as of proposals to extend marriage to include 
same-sex couples, in an intellectually honest and authentic manner.’26 
 However, I believe that even if incitement to hatred laws do prevent some people 
from participating in public discourse in an intellectually honest and authentic 
manner, that is, in a manner of their choosing or in ways that perfectly express who 
they are as people and what they believe in, and even if this prevention thereby has a 
detrimental impact on the collective authorisation and democratic legitimacy of 
downstream laws, free and equal people would nevertheless still have grounds to 
reasonably reject a failure to enact and apply such laws. Whether the rejection is 
reasonable depends not simply on what they are rejecting but also on the grounds of, 
or reasons for, that rejection. To understand why free and equal people could reject 
even a free speech regime that aggressively protects the democratic legitimacy of 
downstream laws, it is necessary to comprehend the gravity of the relevant grounds or 
reasons. It seems to me that free and equal people might reasonably look upon the 
adequate protection of their equal civic dignity, such as via group defamation laws 
(sensu stricto) or incitement to hatred laws, as a precondition of any notional 
agreement to joining the political community. This precondition is no less than what 
free and equal people would stipulate as the sort of basic status or standing they must 
retain in order for them to be willing to join together to form a political community 
with everything this joining together also entails about submitting to governmental 
institutions and a system of law that assumes an obligation to obey the laws because 
they are the laws and that claims a moral right to enforce the laws. Perhaps there are 
other fundamentals of justice, such as safeguarding people’s sense of their physical 
security, that is, freedom from legitimate fear of acts of discrimination or violence, 
that are also preconditions for any notional agreement to joining the political 
community, and that would also require laws, including incitement to hatred laws, 
that combat hate speech that contributes to a climate of fear.27 
 Now suppose for the sake of argument that I am correct to say that a regime of 
free speech that disallowed group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to 
hatred laws could be reasonably rejected on the grounds that it permitted the sorts of 
hate speech that can jeopardise people’s sense of their equal civic dignity and even 
their sense of physical security. What does this mean for the political legitimacy of a 
political community that routinely strikes down such hate speech laws? In brute 
terms, it means that the community is less politically legitimate than it could be. But 
what implications follow from this vis-à-vis characteristic aspects of political 
legitimacy? Following Weinstein’s lead, we might consider (a) a lesser normative 
obligation to obey downstream laws and (b) a lesser moral right of the state to enforce 
such laws. These do not, however, exhaust the possibilities. Take also (c) people 
having grounds on which to regret the loss of legitimacy and to strongly condemn the 
                                                 
25 Transcript obtained directly from Judge Burgess. 
26 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 25 [manuscript]. 
27 BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at 66–75. 
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government concerned, (d) a right to engage in acts of civil disobedience short of 
disobeying justifiable downstream laws, (e) a lesser obligation to support the system 
of law as a whole once again short of breaking justifiable downstream laws (for 
example, tax avoidance or arranging one’s financial affairs to minimise tax liability 
within the law), and even (f) a lesser obligation to refrain from taking the law into 
one’s own hands in the sense of enforcing hate speech norms that ought to be 
enshrined in law but are not (for example, making threats of extrajudicial punishment 
against hate speakers). Unfortunately, I do not have up my sleeve a theory that can 
easily tell us which of these implications are most fitting for political communities 
that unjustifiably fail to enact and apply incitement to hatred laws, for example. But I 
do want to make the point that no adequate discussion could begin and end with an 
assessment of (a) and (b) alone. 
 I now turn to Weinstein’s second main objection. This objection concerns the fact 
that in my book I also invoked the precautionary principle in order to justify, or 
supply further justification for, certain forms of hate speech law. Specifically, I 
argued that ‘an authority may adopt laws forbidding hate speech when it amounts to 
discriminatory harassment in the workplace or on campus, or laws interdicting hate 
speech when it constitutes discriminatory intimidation, because having identified the 
possibility of the catastrophic antidemocratic outcome that a proportion of the 
individuals targeted by hate speech will not participate in the formation of public 
opinion, and bearing in mind the conditions of uncertainty that surround these 
outcomes, it errs on the side of precaution.’28 
 I was certainly not the first scholar to appeal to the precautionary principle as a 
justification for the regulation of hate speech. In her 2008 article, ‘A Constitutional 
“Right” to Deny and Promote Genocide?’, for example, Karen Eltis appealed to the 
principle as a way of both reinterpreting and defending the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in R v. Keegstra.29 This case involved a prosecution of an openly 
anti-Semitic school teacher for the crime of wilful promotion of hatred under s. 319(2) 
(ex s. 281.2(2)) of the Criminal Code.30 According to Eltis, ‘the majority opined that 
hate speech can serve as a precursor to genocide and, through its ruling, advocated a 
precautionary approach to denial and incitement.’31 A similar precautionary 
justification also seems to have played a part in the thinking of the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) in the course of its work monitoring the 
2005 Constitutional Referendum and 2007 General Elections and in pushing through 
new incitement to hatred laws in Kenya.32 It is also implicit in Mari Matsuda’s most 
recent article on hate speech.33 Genocide is not the only applicable harm. For instance, 
Richard Posner has argued that incitement to racial and religious hatred might 
                                                 
28 Id. at 199. 
29 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
30 Karen Eltis, A Constitutional “Right” to Deny and Promote Genocide? Pre-
empting the Usurpation of Human Rights Discourse towards Incitement from a 
Canadian Perspective, 9 CAR. J. CONFL. RES. 463 (2008). 
31 Id. at 476. 
32 See Lawrence Murugu Mute, Legislation, Hate Speech, and Freedom of Expression 
in Kenya (Pambazuka News, October 22, 2008), available at 
www.pambazuka.org/governance/legislation-hate-speech-and-freedom-expression-
kenya. 
33 Mari J. Matsuda, Is Peacemaking Unpatriotic?: The Function of Homophobia in 
the Discursive World, 11 J. HATE STUD. 9, 9–10 (2013–14). 
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constitute a long term threat to national security of sufficient magnitude to warrant 
legal sanctions even in the US − on the hypothesis that heightened levels of 
incitement to hatred against American Muslims increases the risk over the long term 
of terrorist attacks by American Muslims on home soil − keeping in mind that we do 
not know exactly how long it would take for the risk of a terrorist attack to 
significantly ramp up.34 Whilst Posner does not endorse the precautionary principle, 
what he is suggesting is a sort of cost-benefit analysis that builds in a margin of safety 
when it comes to risks of temporally distant but especially serious harms.35 
 The sorts of harms that Eltis, the KNCHR and Posner have in mind (genocide, 
terrorist atrocities) are grave and irreversible. They are equivalent to the devastating 
climate change harms that are associated with the precautionary principle in the field 
of environmental regulation. Of course, the sorts of harms that I focused on in Chapter 
7 of my book are not of the same magnitude of gravity as these. Nevertheless, they are 
potentially more probable harms and more proximate harms, causally speaking. While 
they are not strictly irreversible (as with loss of life), they are not easily reversible. 
And whilst less grave, they are still extremely serious. I am speaking of the 
antidemocratic outcome that a proportion of the individuals targeted by hate speech 
will not contribute to public discourse nor participate in the formation of public 
opinion, or will do so but with speech the content of which has been warped, or will 
do so but without the ability or power to achieve intended illocutionary or 
perlocutionary effects.36 (Of course, the precautionary principle might also be applied 
to other types of hate speech law that address other categories of extremely serious 
harm other than the aforementioned antidemocratic outcome.37) According to 
Weinstein, however, my ‘invocation of the precautionary principle in lieu evidence 
[...] turns a problematic though plausible argument into a plainly indefensible one.’38 
 According to the strong version of the precautionary principle I had in mind, the 
burden of proof is placed not on those wishing to regulate or support the regulation of 
potentially harmful activities but on those who wish to engage in or support those 
                                                 
34 RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A 
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 124 (2006). 
35 Id. at 122. See also RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND 
RESPONSE (2004). 
36 For an overview of the literature, see BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 
2, at 84–86, 198. 
37 For example, the principle could potentially be invoked to justify laws disallowing 
the use of epithets or insults directed at or targeted against individuals based on their 
possession or perceived possession of protected characteristics, such as if such speech 
had the potential to cause in a proportion of those subject to it serious psychological 
damage, such as anxiety or distress, or to exacerbate the symptoms of pre-existing 
mental illnesses, such as depression, or to trigger the onset of mental illnesses to 
which individuals may have already been at risk, such as antisocial personality 
disorder, even if there was a lack of decisive or consensus-based evidence to prove 
these effects. Id. at 49–58. Or, to take another example, the principle might be 
invoked to justify laws banning incitement to hatred if such speech had the potential 
to significantly contribute to the production and maintenance of a climate of hatred 
which is partly constituted by an increased chance of acts of discrimination, violence, 
damage to property, and so forth, even if there was a lack of decisive or consensus-
based evidence to prove this contribution. Id. at 66–75. 
38 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 37 [manuscript].  
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activities. It is they who should demonstrate that the activities would not produce 
significant harms if left unregulated based on evidence that is sufficiently rigorous, 
comprehensive and abundant to command a consensus among the relevant body of 
experts. The upshot is that the principle may require regulation of activities because 
there is lack of consensus-based evidence that the activities would not produce 
significant harms if left unregulated. It goes without saying, however, that there must 
be at least some minimally adequate evidence that the relevant activities have certain 
effects and that these effects are potentially harmful in order to shift the burden in this 
way. I believe that this threshold has been met for hate speech and various types of 
silencing effect.39 But it is not necessary for the evidence of harm itself to be 
consensus-based. 
At any rate, the crux of Weinstein’s objection to my invocation of the 
precautionary principle is his assertion that there is a worrying asymmetry between 
the regulation of hate speech that has certain or known harmful effects, measured in 
terms of some speakers’ reduced opportunities to contribute to public discourse and 
participate in the formation of public opinion, and the justification of such regulation 
in the name of preventing only possible or potential harmful effects, measured in the 
same way (only focusing on the subjects of hate speech). He writes: 
 
The view that bigots can be forbidden by force of law from expressing their 
views − which will, if the law has any effect at all, undoubtedly have 
“silencing effect” on them − to avoid the possibility that some unspecified 
“proportion of the individuals targeted by the hate speech” might be deterred 
from speaking is simply impossible to square with basic premise underlying 
participatory democracy that all citizens should have the equal opportunity to 
engage in the formation of public opinion citizens regardless of the viewpoint 
they want to express.40 
 
 Of course, the known harmful effects of hate speech regulations are not limited to 
reducing the speakers’ opportunities to contribute to public discourse and participate 
in the formation of democratic public opinion.41 But, to focus on the democratic 
                                                 
39 In other words, I do not accept the premise (present in some objections to hate 
speech laws) that there is a paucity of evidence (i.e., not a minimally adequate level of 
evidence) of harmful silencing effects. See BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra 
note 2, at 98–99. For evidence of silence (or passivity) as a common response to, and 
effect of, hate speech, see, e.g., Laura Leets, Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions 
and Responses to Anti-Semitism and Antigay, 58 J. SOC. ISS. 341 (2002); and 
Katharine Gelber and Luke J. McNamara, Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, 22 
SOC. IDENT. 324 (2016). For an analysis of what silencing means in terms of 
harmfully removing real opportunities to participate in the formation of public 
opinion, see, e.g., BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at 194–208. I 
would like to thank the journal’s editor, Jill Hasday, for suggesting I make these 
important clarifications, which I had not made in the original version of my 
contribution. 
40 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 37 [manuscript]. 
41 Other harmful effects include a reduction of negative freedom to engage in hate 
speech and thereby to pursue self-development (for example, truth discovery, self-
realisation). See BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at ch. 4. Then there 
is the loss of formal autonomy. Hate speech regulations substitute a governmental 
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harms, I believe that in addition to the asymmetry between certain and potential 
effects, there is another asymmetry that Weinstein either ignores or underestimates, 
and that makes the invocation of the precautionary principle more not less justified. 
The asymmetry I have in mind is in the nature of the silencing effect at issue. When 
the state intervenes to criminalise certain forms of hate speech, narrowly framed laws 
will curtail only that given form of speech. Such laws, sensibly and properly applied, 
will not stop the speaker from expressing him or herself in other permissible ways. As 
mentioned above, if laws prohibit the use of threatening words or behaviour to stir up 
hatred, then hate speakers can perform the same speech acts in other ways, using other 
kinds of words or behaviour. So, for example, a hate speaker might be banned from 
saying this. “You think you can trust Muslims, think again, they are vile, backward, 
and dangerous people who deserve only our hatred, and when this country is finally 
united in its hatred of Muslims, they had better watch out!” But he might not be 
banned from saying this. “You think you can trust Muslims, think again, they are vile, 
backward, and dangerous people who deserve only our hatred.” By contrast, in the 
event that hate speech has a silencing effect on those who are its subjects, the effect is 
just that, silence; it can cause people not to speak in any way. Of course, Robert Post 
is very convincing when he states that part of the point of the First Amendment is to 
protect citizens’ right to choose the ways, manner, and circumstances of their 
participation in the formation of public opinion.42 But surely another, perhaps even 
more fundamental purpose of a regime of free speech is to ensure that all citizens 
enjoy at least sufficient real opportunities to participate in public discourse.43 
 It seems to me that part of the raw intuitive appeal of the precautionary principle 
stems from the idea that we ought to be better safe than sorry. When it comes to hate 
speech harms it is important to attend closely to who the “we” are, and what harm 
they face. It is precisely because the nature of the harm (silencing) is different for hate 
speakers and those people who are the unwilling subjects of hate speech that it is not 
impossible to square the precautionary approach with the principle that all citizens 
should have the equal opportunity to engage in the formation of public opinion. 
Perhaps Weinstein thinks that any application of a strong version of the precautionary 
principle is plainly indefensible. If so, then the grounds for his objection takes him 
well beyond the hate speech debate and, more importantly, his objection requires 
significant bolstering, well beyond his brief remarks in the article.44 
                                                                                                                                            
choice for a personal choice about how and when to embody one’s values in speech, 
including a personal choice as to what is appropriate and what is inappropriate public 
speech. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Hate Speech, in THE CONTENT AND 
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND 
RESPONSES 57, 63–64 (M. Herz and P. Molnar eds., 2012). For further discussion, 
see BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at 210–13. 
42 See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN 
ERA 152, 167 (L. Bollinger and G. Stone eds., 2002); and Robert Post, Democracy 
and Equality, 1 L. CUL. HUM. 142, 148 (2005). 
43 See BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW, supra note 2, at 194–201. 
44 For general criticisms of the precautionary principle in various spheres of law and 
regulation, see CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the 
Precautionary Principle? An American Assessment from an Administrative Law 
Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581 (2006); and STEVE FULLER AND 
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 Building on his two main objections, Weinstein ends with an offer to rescue my 
arguments. He writes: ‘I will build on some of Brown’s better arguments to try to 
identify a countervailing legitimacy concern sufficiently similar in type and character 
to the legitimacy that I have argued is diminished or destroyed with respect to 
downstream legislation, and which, therefore could, at least theoretically, offset this 
deficit.’45 He then proffers the following interesting case. 
 
Suppose, for instance, that in a certain democratic country the legislature is 
considering whether to grant an exemption from its drug laws to members of 
the indigenous population for use of a substance traditionally used in its 
religious ceremonies. Suppose that it is also the case that hate speech against 
this group, long subject to discrimination by the European settlors and their 
descendants, is so rampant and virulent that many members of this vulnerable 
minority groups are “out of fear for their personal safety or livelihood” 
reasonably deterred by the hate speech from publicly supporting the 
exemption. If the exemption is not passed, then members of this indigenous 
community might well feel, and aptly so, that they have no political 
obligation to obey law against ingesting the drug as part of their religious 
ceremony.46 
 
However, Weinstein does not go on to actually defend what I attempted to defend, 
namely, banning the hate speech in question. He claims that ‘it must be further 
demonstrated that the gain in legitimacy produced by the hate speech ban at least 
marginally exceeds the detriment to legitimacy caused by the speech restriction.’47 
 I believe that Weinstein misunderstands what is really at stake here. For one 
thing, his talk of gains in democratic legitimacy produced by the hate speech ban 
offsetting the detriment to democratic legitimacy caused by the speech restriction is 
anathema to what I see as the basic proposition underlying participatory democracy 
and democratic legitimacy. The real touchstone is ensuring that all citizens enjoy at 
least sufficient real opportunities to contribute to public discourse and participate in 
the formation of public opinion. I also think that it makes perfect sense to ask whether 
or not this basic proposition or touchstone can itself claim political legitimacy, based 
on the test of interpersonal justification and consensus among free and equal citizens. 
The question is: would free and equal people have reasons based on the fundamentals 
of justice to reject an aggressive free speech regime that treated hate speech as a 
protected category even though certain forms of hate speech carry a risk of effectively 
                                                                                                                                            
VERONIKA LIPINSKA, THE PROACTIONARY IMPERATIVE: A 
FOUNDATION FOR TRANSHUMANISM (2014). For a defence, see Timothy 
O’Riordan and Andrew Jordan, The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary 
Environmental Politics, 4 ENV. VAL. 191 (1995); Marko Ahteensuu, Defending the 
Precautionary Principle Against Three Criticisms, 11 TRAMES 366 (2005); David 
Dana, The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35 Q. L. J. 67 
(2009); and NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB ET AL., THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (WITH APPLICATION TO THE GENETIC MODIFICATION OF 
ORGANISMS (NYU School of Engineering Working Paper Series, September 4, 
2014), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.5787.pdf. 
45 Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 1, at 37 [manuscript]. 
46 Id. at 37–38 [manuscript]. 
47 Id. at 38 [manuscript]. 
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removing from some people who are the subject of hate speech real opportunities to 
contribute to public discourse and participate in the formation of public opinion? 
 Moreover, I believe that by refocusing the debate about hate speech law onto the 
question of obligations to obey downstream laws, Weinstein has overlooked a far 
more important question. Why should people who are subject to hate speech and 
interpersonal silencing be put in a position of having to think about whether they have 
no political obligation to obey downstream laws much less of having to contemplate 
disobeying these laws as a means of addressing the diminished democratic legitimacy 
of those laws? To fall into this way of thinking about their predicament risks imposing 
three harms on the victims of hate speech: first, the harm of being subject to silencing 
hate speech, as in, hate speech that, due to its psychological as well as material 
effects, freezes them out of contributing to public discourse and participating in the 
formation of public opinion; second, having a decision about downstream laws go 
against them partly because they did not contribute to public discourse and participate 
in the formation of public opinion; and third, the harm of having to engage in 
potentially risky forms of civil disobedience simply to make their point. Adopting the 
precautionary principle as a justification for effective hate speech regulations means 
that victims of hate speech may be spared this triply unenviable position. 
 
